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Abstract. Ferguson provides evidence from Kissinger’s early academic writings involving 
Kantian philosophy and nineteenth century diplomacy, but continuing much later, that his 
subject was not the one-dimensional realist many have taken him to be. Kissinger was in 
fact a Kantian idealist, thought Prince Metternich to be backward-looking, and had serious 
reservations about the thrust of Bismarck’s power politics… Ferguson’s account of his 
record regarding Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations demonstrates 
that Kissinger never opposed overall war strategy, although he made tactical criticisms of it.  
Ferguson and Kissinger both neglect evidence that Kennedy was moving in an opposite 
direction regarding Vietnam, and that serious intra-Vietnam peace talks were underway in 
1963. Such neglect leaves a misleading impression about historical alternatives Ferguson’s 
account provides much evidence that Kissinger’s, and US, expectations for what might be 
obtained at the negotiating table in 1967-68 were unrealistic–this is a cardinal criticism of 
Kissinger and Nixon’s performance… Kissinger’s premises for continuing in Vietnam were 
usually geopolitical, rather than based on careful understanding of what was happening on 
the ground; and his view of power relations, at least during the 1950s and 1960s, gave 
insufficient attention to the role of nonaligned countries in contributing to international 
stability. Also, Kissinger thought maintaining US credibility an almost independent 
rationale for continuing the war effort. Credibility arguments work best, however, where 
their advocates are otherwise on the right side of history. Just as the US security framework 
survived concessions to avoid nuclear war over Berlin or Cuba, it would survive the post-
Vietnam consequence that troop commitments would henceforth be severely limited. The 
Kissinger-Nixon approach to Vietnam suffered from too little foreign policy realism, not 
too much. 
Keywords. Niall Ferguson, Henry Kissinger, John F. Kennedy, Charles DeGaulle, Hans 
Morgenthau, Vietnam War. 
JEL. F50, F52, F59. 
 
1. Introduction 
erguson’s recent biography of Henry Kissinger self-consciously follows 
R.G. Collingwood’s premise that history is “a re-enactment of a past 
thought, [e]ncapsulated in a context of present thoughts…” (Ferguson, 
2015; 1  p. xvi). The subject, Kissinger, has sought historical and intellectual 
precedent for his arguments and his policies to an extent that makes him unusual 
among foreign policy practitioners. Ferguson evaluates Kissinger’s record in this 
context, and Kissinger presumably expects as much. Ferguson has requisite 
background in intellectual history and in past and present diplomatic complexities 
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to attempt such a task. He has also devoured reams of archival evidence, and has 
taken in Kissinger’s published and most of his unpublished writings. His 
descriptions of various settings from Kissinger’s biography – including Nazi 
Germany in the 1930s, upper Manhattan before World War II, the US Army during 
and after the war, Harvard University as a student and faculty member, various 
official consulting roles, and Kennedy and Johnson Administration politics in 
Washington -- are colorful and absorbing. 
Ferguson reaches the conclusion that Kissinger was not always a foreign policy 
“realist;” indeed, his academic background included embrace of a very ethics-
driven framework from German idealism. Ferguson’s case is that such study was 
not merely an academic interlude, but in fact played a role in building his policy 
arguments for decades to come. A weakness in Ferguson’s account rests in some of 
his own judgments about Kissinger’s academic and public life; he has a tendency 
to defend Kissinger’s role even where hisown narrative points toward harsher 
conclusions. But these are quibbles, inasmuch as Ferguson opens new information 
and perspectives about diplomatic complexities Kissinger confronted and in turn 
influenced. This review highlights Kissinger’s views on US policy in Vietnam in 
the years before he was named President Richard Nixon’s chief foreign policy 
advisor at the end of 1968.   
 
2. Idealism and Realism 
An organizing theme for Ferguson is that Kissinger was originally a 
philosophical idealist and always retained a core of idealism. This is unexpected, 
not least because Kissinger has called himself a realist, an advocate of 
unsentimental pursuit of the national interest, for as long as almost anyone can 
remember. Kissinger has never viewed himself as a Wilsonian idealist, who wanted 
to bring democracy or self-determination as a policy priority. He had no interest in 
conservative idealism, for example of the kind represented by Russia’s Alexander I 
at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Nor has he ever been receptive to Neo-
Conservatism, whether of its anti-Soviet variety in the 1970s or to the 
transformative, anti-Islamist version of the past decade and a half.   
As an undergraduate at Harvard during 1947-1950, Kissinger was enrolled in 
political science, but read voraciously in the history of ideas. Kissinger’s advisor, 
Professor Bill Elliott, encouraged him to study Immanuel Kant, around whose 
ethical framework much of his 380-page thesis, The Meaning of History, would be 
organized. For Ferguson, the theme of Kissinger’s idealism is almost new in the 
literature, and its near-absence has “vitiated severely, if not fatally, the historical 
judgments” many have passed (p.28), and it is important enough to include in the 
book’s title.2 It merits summary here.  
Kantian “idealism” connotes that properties we discover in objects depend on 
the way that those objects appear to us as perceiving subjects, in space and time, 
and not as something they possess "in themselves", apart from our experience.  
This framework is sufficient to overcome skepticisms of Berkeley and Hume, to 
restore contact with real objects, and to account for “causality” and “necessity” as 
they are recognized in modern science. But it does not tell us how aesthetics, 
religion, and (especially) free moral action can be understood: that is, how can the 
same behavior be both scientifically determined and freely chosen? The answer is 
that we cannot know with certainty in a given instance whether free will is 
exercised, but we can posit that it might be, and we are therefore obligated as moral 
agents to try to exercise it.3 
Given the potential for moral action - which Kissinger wanted to use to define 
meaning in history - what might realize it? Kant established that as moral agents 
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we seek to act in accord with duty; and we can will that a maxim for carrying out 
such duty should become a universal ethical requirement (hence, a “categorical 
imperative”) - thereby resolving the earlier puzzle by making the same act, driven 
now by an ideal, both determined and free. This conception is formal, hence it does 
not tell us what the specific, or substantive, imperatives might be - yet substantive 
imperatives are what philosophers, including Kant, often want to find. Such 
maxims, if we could derive them, would be very helpful in making political and 
historical judgements. Kissinger butted up against the difficulty of identifying such 
substantive maxims in his thesis.  He wrote, for example: 
The categorical imperative provides the frame-work for Kant’s philosophy of 
history. If the transcendental experience of freedom represents the condition 
for the apprehension of the greater truth at the core of all phenomenal 
appearances, then its maxims must constitute norms in the political field… 
the possibility of the categorical imperative results from its very conception 
not from its relation to empirical reality.” (Kissinger, 1950: pp. 262-263) 
Much of Kissinger’s thesis was devoted to explaining that such thinkers as 
Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler (who were not working in a Kantian 
framework) did not succeed in finding maxims that could inject judgements into 
history, or, as he put it, that could “expand the philosophy of history into a guide 
for guaranteeing the attainability of the moral law.” Kissinger tried to find such a 
Kantian maxim – for example, in a requirement to work for eternal peace -- but 
concluded that Kant had not succeeded. (p. 240) 
[Thus arises] the dilemma inherent in all philosophy…: the connection 
between the necessary and the possible.  It is a problem which Kant too 
considered and failed to solve completely.  In order to establish the validity 
of his categorical imperative as a foundation of eternal peace, Kant was 
forced to demonstrate the possibility of its application.  But his proof of 
feasibility became a dictum of necessity and seems to negate the moral basis 
of the categorical imperative.” (Kissinger, 1950; p. 123) 
Kant failed in that task because a categorical imperative is meaningless if 
derived in the abstract, or in personal isolation. Kant’s deeper argument was that 
such duty-driven imperatives had no status outside a community of moral agents 
through which maxims might be derived and “made applicable” (Kissinger, 1950, 
p. 123). Six decades later, in World Order, Kissinger again dismissed peace-
seeking as a maxim that could be directly applied.  He went on, for similar reasons, 
to reject proposals in Kant’s 1795 essay On Eternal Peace for a “perfect civil union 
of mankind” as representing brashness to the point of hubris in the power of 
reason. (Kissinger, 2014b; p. 40) 
While Kissinger could not derive specific political maxims from Kantian ethics, 
he gained from his study, first, the perspective that one can genuinely experience 
freedom in “inwardly confronting” options, or “as a process of deciding [among] 
meaningful alternatives” (p.869). For example, more than a quarter-century after 
The Meaning of History, Kissinger was still citing Kant to explain an opposition 
between two imperatives, the obligation to defend freedom and the necessity for 
coexistence with adversaries (p.28). Later, especially during the Vietnam War, he 
would set domestic justice within contested countries against geopolitical goals.  
Second, his experience of such inward freedom led him to emphasize the 
importance of discourse and “ideals.”  On this basis, he would choose a system that 
advanced freedom even if curtailing it would increase material welfare and 
efficiency (pp. 242-243). Ferguson at one point calls Kissinger a “dogmatic anti-
materialist” (p. 803).  
A critic could say that his Kantian framework is where Kissinger went off-track.  
Ferguson comments that Kissinger showed no interest whatever in the idealism of 
Hegel (p.29), although he does not tell us whether Kissinger rejected Hegel after 
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reading him, or whether perhaps Professor Elliott discouraged him from engaging 
Hegel in the first place. In fact, Kantian idealism’s incomplete capacity to reconcile 
scientific necessity with moral freedom did much to incubate post-Kantian German 
idealisms. Kissinger wanted to understand freedom, and “meaning,” in history, 
inside Time. Kant, finally, could not help much with that. As the great French 
Hegelian Alexandre Kojeve explained in the 1930s: 
To the extent that there is [in Kant] … [an] act of freedom, the relation to 
time is accomplished ‘before’ Time.  The act of freedom, while being related 
to Time, is therefore outside of Time.  It is the renowned ‘choice of the 
intelligible character.’  The choice is not temporal, but it determines Man’s 
whole temporal existence, in which, therefore, there is no freedom….  Man, 
as historical being, remains inexplicable.  The history he creates by temporal 
free acts is not understood.” (Kojeve, 1969; pp. 129-130) 
A much older Kissinger reached similar conclusions, but without linking them 
to an Hegelian framework. He wrote that we could not discover historical meaning 
through reflection or declaration - which is essentially what Kant wanted to do - 
but only by facing challenges as they arise in real events. (Kissinger, 2014b; p. 
374). We can ask whether Kissinger’s intellectual framework during his years in 
power would have been different had he grappled with such post-Kantian concepts 
during or soon after his student years at Harvard. A realist geopolitician-in-waiting 
might have learned more from reliving the dialectic of ideologies in history than 
from consideration of inner freedom and the juxtaposition of extra-temporal ideals. 
Ferguson often sets Hans Morgenthau, the leading foreign policy realist of the 
post-WWII generation, as a counterpoint to Kissinger.4 In contrast to Kissinger’s 
Kantian influence, Morgenthau during the mid- and late-1920s read nearly every 
word Friedrich Nietzsche ever published. Reflecting Nietzsche’s influence, 
Morgenthau wrote in his diary in 1927 that “genuinely strong characters” accept 
life as it is. He wrote in a 1931 letter, “only adolescents cherish ideas about making 
the world a better place.” Quoting Nietzsche directly, he added that to ascertain 
“what is and how it is, seems vastly nobler and much more responsible than any 
speculation about how it ought to be” (Morgenthau, 1936: p. 5).  He reformulated 
this a few years later as “Je constate simplement ce que je vois” - I simply state 
what I see. In contrast to premises drawn from Kantian metaphysics, these 
aphorisms suggest the intellectual roots of a realist (Frei, 2001; pp. 101-102). 
Ferguson’s account of Kissinger’s views on 19th century diplomacy is 
revisionist. Despite many impressions otherwise, Kissinger did not at all take 
Prince Klemens von Metternich as a role model, and while he admired Otto von 
Bismarck’s diplomatic acumen, he also believed consequences of Bismarck’s role 
on German history were very mixed. 
Kissinger intended A World Restored (1957), based on his doctoral dissertation, 
as a work of history, not as a blueprint for his own exercise of power a decade-and-
a-half later. The book’s public reception emphasized the role of Metternich, 
Austria’s foreign minister at the 1815 (post-Napoleon) Vienna conference and 
subsequently its chancellor. In Diplomacy, Kissinger (1994; pp. 82-83) explains 
that post-Napoleonic peace was maintained not through an arithmetic balance of 
power alone but also through shared values – that is, legitimacy.  But Ferguson’s 
evidence makes clear that, in Kissinger’s view, Metternich’s success was 
instrumental and manipulative; it was not creative, and (in Kantian language) was 
not based on the “superiority of its maxims” (p.302). Kissinger depicted Metternich 
as a rigid protagonist for “an illusory restoration of the old order,” which was a 
battle against nationalism and liberalism (p.307). To underline the point, he 
described Metternich’s face as “without depth,” and his conversation as “brilliant 
but without ultimate seriousness” (p.293). The legitimacy, reflected in a “Holy 
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Alliance” among Austria, Prussia and Russia, and directed against France, was 
backward-looking, and that version of European stability was not going to last.  
Ferguson indicates that Kissinger intended to complete a trilogy on 19th century 
diplomacy, with a central theme that Metternich’s stability carried the seeds of 
violent destruction a century later. He wrote that Metternich “lacked the capacity to 
contemplate an abyss, not with the detachment of a scientist, but as a challenge to 
be overcome – or to perish in the process” (pp. 302-303). 
A more impressive diplomatic model from A World Restored was Lord Robert 
Stewart Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary at Vienna. Castlereagh urged 
Britain to play an ongoing role not as an active participant in Europe – a role left to 
continental powers –but as an offshore balancer. As a down payment on his 
concept, when he arrived in Vienna he discarded his instructions from London, 
dissolved the victorious wartime coalition, and demanded moderation toward post-
Napoleonic France. Britain had fought against Napoleon “for security not for 
doctrine, against universal conquest not against revolution” (p. 306-307). Kissinger 
saw Castlereagh’s conception of offshore balancer as a framework for the US a 
century and a half later. Unfortunately for the future peace of Europe, Kissinger 
argues, Britain would play this role only fitfully. As early as the Aix-la-Chapelle 
conference of 1818, Britain had drawn back from Castlereagh’s vision, setting a 
tone for what was to come; his diplomatic instructions indicated that Britain was to 
interfere only in “great emergencies,” and otherwise to avoid “continental 
entanglements” (Kissinger, 1994; p. 89). Looking forward, Kissinger (1994; pp. 
212-214) asserts that a forthright statement of British commitment in July 1914 
might have dissuaded the German Kaiser from confrontation.  Castlereagh was a 
tragic figure, as he killed himself in 1822, perhaps a casualty of frustration over his 
thwarted European agenda. 
Europe had changed by the time Bismarck rose to prominence in the 1850s and 
became Prussia’s Minister-President in 1862. The revolutions of 1848 capsized the 
legitimacy of the restoration order nurtured by Metternich – who then resigned as 
the Austrian chancellor. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 allowed France to break 
out of its post-Vienna diplomatic isolation. The European order symbolized by 
Metternich could be represented metaphorically with an eighteenth century model 
of the universe as a great clock, tending toward harmony and balance. Bismarck’s 
new order and the unification of Germany in 1871 looked more like Darwinian 
survival of the fittest. Bismarck indicated that any state should value its 
opportunities over its principles – meaning it should coldly pursue its interests.  
However, as a superior practitioner of power, Bismarck also understood its limits, 
which distinguished him from many of his admirers and most of his successors 
(pp.697-698). While he preserved much of the traditional aristocracy in Prussia, he 
also introduced universal suffrage and social legislation – and the latter helped to 
stanch what had already been a millions-strong outflow of German emigration to 
America.   
Because Bismarck was no longer constrained by an anti-revolutionary 
framework, Prussia under his direction could be closer to all of the contending 
European powers than any of the rest of them were to each other. This practice 
allowed Bismarck to maintain the peace of Europe for two decades following 
German unification. It was also to become a model for Kissinger as the Nixon 
administration reached for an opening to China and détente with the Soviet Union. 
But Kissinger also found something disturbing about Bismarck’s legacy. The 
title of his Daedal us article - “The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck” 
- published in 1968, but written a decade earlier, suggested much.  As we will see 
again, Kissinger dreaded revolution because of extreme measures that would be 
needed at some point to contain it. The obverse of Bismarck’s facility with the 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 3(2), C. Johnson, p.83-110. 
88 
calculus of power was disdain for Restoration concepts of legitimacy. Prussia’s 
conservatives distrusted Bismarck from the outset. Ferguson has unearthed some 
unpublished manuscripts from the 1950s from which we learn that Kissinger at that 
time saw Bismarck’s Real politik as dangerously immoral. In portentous language, 
Kissinger wrote--  
… about the nature of the new world that [Bismarck] was conjuring up, a 
world in which only miscalculation was evil and only failure is a sin.  It was 
a world without illusion in which only giants or nihilists could live. (p. 700) 
… It was the essence of Bismarck’s revolutionary quality that he drew the 
full consequences from his skepticism – that all belief became to him only 
factors to be manipulated. … Thus the more Bismarck preached his doctrine 
the more humanly remote he became.  The more rigorous he was in applying 
his lessons the more incomprehensible he became to his contemporaries.  Nor 
was it strange that the conservatives gradually came to see in him the voice of 
the devil (p. 702). 
Kissinger’s unease continued.  In Real politik terms, Bismarck failed because an 
effective successor would have to have similar skills in assessing power relations.  
Potential Bismarcks are always in short supply. Kissinger’s study of Bismarck 
seems to have crystalized what he already considered in A World Restored – that a 
balance of power requires a leavening of legitimacy if it is to produce lasting 
stability.  Kissinger did waver eventually from his early judgments, and Ferguson 
notes that at some point, probably during the 1960s, he deleted a particularly 
idealistic paragraph from his Bismarck manuscript (p. 874). Writing in 2011, 
Kissinger acknowledged that Bismarck was not indifferent to ideals: 
Bismarck dominated because he understood a wider range of factors relevant 
to international affairs — some normally identified with power, others 
generally classified as ideals — than any of his contemporaries. 
Bismarck is often cited as the quintessential realist, relying on power at 
the expense of ideals. He was, in fact, far more complicated. Power, to be 
useful, must be understood in its components, including its limits. By the 
same token, ideals must be brought, at some point, into relationship with the 
circumstances the leader is seeking to affect. Ignoring that balance threatens 
policy with either veering toward belligerence from the advocates of power 
or toward crusades by the idealists (Kissinger, 2011). 
Ferguson does not consider this late judgement on Bismarck (at least not in 
Volume I); but his biography achieves much in calling attention to Kissinger’s 
discomfort with unalloyed power seeking. Where he misleads somewhat is in his 
implication that other realists, including Morgenthau (Frei, 2001; p. 7), even 
including Bismarck, disdain ideals. But by the end of the current volume, Ferguson 
concludes that an effective statesman will find it possible to “zigzag” between the 
poles of idealism and realism. (pp. 873-874) 
 
3. Kennedy and Vietnam 
Ferguson devotes more pages to describing Kissinger’s understanding of and 
activity with regard to unfolding events in Vietnam during the 1960s than to any 
other foreign policy topic. And while Kissinger’s record in the Nixon and Ford 
administrations is far-reaching, historic judgment will weigh heavily on his and 
Nixon’s Vietnam decisions. Ferguson’s account of the years before he became 
National Security Advisor provides much context. 
Ferguson reports that Kissinger in private was a “scathing critic” of Vietnam 
policy of both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (p. 583). Kissinger, 
seeking some policy distance, told Der Spiegel in 2014, “You have to remember 
that the administration in which I served inherited the war in Vietnam” (Kissinger, 
2014a). In November 1968, he said, inaccurately, “I never supported the war in 
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public” (p. 822). In fact, Ferguson records at least four previous instances in which 
Kissinger did publicly defend the war: a letter to the NY Times signed by 190 
academics and participation in a Harvard v. Oxford debate in December 1965; 
another debate, this time at the University of North Caroline in June 1966; and a 
Look magazine interview later that year. (pp. 670-672) 
As an advisor to the Kennedy Administration, he challenged the effectiveness 
of gradual escalation in Vietnam during 1961 and 1962, and criticized the decision 
to continue assistance to the Ngo Dinh Diem government absent “substantial” 
reform (pp. 588-589). Tactical criticisms aside, however, Ferguson’s evidence 
reinforces the conclusion that Kissinger never challenged the strategic wisdom of 
the US intervention or troop buildup in Vietnam. In March 1965, for example, he 
wrote to assure MacGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor under both 
Kennedy and Johnson (and who had been Kissinger’s dean at Harvard) that “I 
think our present actions in Vietnam are essentially right and to express my respect 
for the courage with which the Administration is acting”. Two weeks later, he 
wrote again to say “…the carping of some of your former colleagues at Harvard 
may create a misleading impression of unanimity [against the Administration’s 
policy]. I will look for an early opportunity to state my views publicly” (p. 623). 
Ferguson describes Kissinger generally as an “idealist committed to resisting 
Communist advance and an advocate of “limited war’” (p. 587). 
Ferguson backs up his not-very-robust defense of Kissinger as an insightful 
critic of Vietnam policy with a harsh depiction of John F. Kennedy. The latter, he 
tallies, was a philanderer, unscrupulous in his political ethics, who sat out the 
censure vote on Senator Joseph McCarthy, fought dirty in the Cold War (including 
connivance in the 1963 coup and assassination plot against Ngo Dinh Diem in 
South Vietnam,) and ran an ill-coordinated administration (pp. 514-515). Most of 
these ring true, but they miss what is essential, which were Kennedy’s efforts to 
reverse the escalation in Vietnam and to change the dynamic of Cold War 
diplomacy – perhaps to nurture détente a decade ahead of time, or even to end the 
Cold War altogether. Then-Congressman Kennedy travelled to Vietnam in 1951 
during the French war there, and drew the conclusion that it would be very difficult 
for any Western power to win under such circumstances.  In 1954, Vice President 
Nixon called for intervention, if necessary using tactical nuclear weapons, to 
support the imperiled French effort; Kennedy, by then a senator, argued publicly 
against intervention where he doubted even a “remote prospect of victory”. In 
1957, in what was criticized as almost reckless, Kennedy spoke in the Senate 
against the French war in Algeria (Mahoney, 1983: pp. 15-20). As President, 
quietly but in a similar pattern, Kennedy maintained an extensive private 
correspondence with Premier Khrushchev beginning in September 1961 and 
initiated efforts through a third party to open communication with Cuba’s Castro 
beginning in October 1963 (Douglas, 2010).5 
John Newman (1992; p. 453) describes this key 1961 decision of the Kennedy 
Administration regarding Vietnam: 
Kennedy’s final decision – NSAM (National Security Action Memorandum) 
111, issued on November 22, 1961 – against intervention, was arrived at after 
all the arguments for it that could be made had been mustered: when the 
intelligence unequivocally showed the battlefield situation was desperate, 
when all his top advisors agreed that the fate of Vietnam hung in the balance, 
and when most of them believed that vital US interests in the region and the 
world were at stake.  Clearly, then, it was the major Vietnam decision of his 
presidency, drawing, as it did, a line that he never crossed. One of the 
principal theses of this work, derived from that decision, is that Kennedy 
would never have placed American combat troops in Vietnam. (Italics 
added.) 
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Prior to NSAM-111, Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor to Vietnam for a 
first-hand look in October 1961. Taylor’s original draft instructions for the trip 
included looking at whether to invoke SEATO provisions and whether to introduce 
US forces; Kennedy redrafted the instructions to remove both of these. Taylor’s 
report on November 3, against the President’s guidelines, called for deploying a 
combat force of 8,000; Defense Secretary McNamara followed up a few days later 
with a top-secret memo to the President calling for 205,000 troops – the demand 
for a large deployment was already there as early as 1961 (Parker, 2005; p. 370; 
FRUS, 1988). NSAM-111 rejected these requests (Logevall, 1999; p. 26f). Taylor 
acknowledged two decades later to Army historian Andrew Krepinevich that he 
went to Vietnam “knowing the President did not want a recommendation to send 
forces.”  
Taylor’s proposals left Kennedy blindsided, and nearly isolated among senior 
national security officials (Newman, 1992; pp. 135-136; Parker, 2005; pp. 369ff). 
In an effort to block the momentum in favor of escalation, he twice sent his Indian 
Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith to Vietnam to prepare contrary opinions; as 
Galbraith sardonically explained to his family, “[the President] sent me to Vietnam 
because he knew I did not have an open mind” (Galbraith, 2003).6 Kennedy told 
Galbraith during the latter’s visit to Washington in November 1961: 
There are limits to the number of defeats I can defend in one twelve-month 
period… I’ve had the Bay of Pigs, pulling out of Laos, and I can’t accept a 
third. 
Kennedy was also concerned about stirring a domestic replay of the “Who Lost 
China?” debate of a decade earlier (Reeves, 1993; p. 261). But it is likely that 
Galbraith’s April 4, 1962, memo and subsequent meeting with Kennedy reinforced 
the latter’s doubts about the war and led to McNamara’s instruction in May 1962 to 
plan for withdrawal of 1,000 troops from Vietnam (Galbraith, 2003). 
Kennedy’s evolving strategic outlook was closely held.  We know, for example, 
from the slow drip of information releases on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that 
Kennedy’s decision to trade removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba for removal of US 
Polaris missiles in Turkey was shared only narrowly even within the crisis 
Executive Committee (and did not include EXCOMM member Vice President 
Johnson). It was publicly denied, until acknowledged in 1982 by former Kennedy 
Administration figures in a Time magazine article.  The other shoe dropped with 
the release of tape transcripts in 1987, which showed that the President was nearly 
alone in his decision, and that almost everyone else in the room -including 
McNamara and Robert Kennedy- adamantly objected to the trade.  Fred Kaplan 
more recently speculates that “JFK himself was departing from the views of 
Kennedy men” (Kaplan, 2012). This narrative offers some background for 
understanding subsequent administrative disarray in executing Vietnam policy. 
Newman offers evidence that Kennedy in early months of 1963 shared his 
intention to disengage from Vietnam within a limited circle that included 
O’Donnell, Galbraith, Senator Mike Mansfield, and probably McNamara, among 
others– but certainly did not include Rusk, Bundy, or Taylor (Newman, 1992; pp. 
321-324) 7 . Reasons for such guardedness were 1) accumulating evidence, 
persuasive to Kennedy by February or March 1963, that military and intelligence 
officials, led by Generals Taylor and Paul Harkins, were feeding him a deliberately 
optimistic picture of progress in Vietnam in order to force his hand (Newman, 
1992; p. 320); and 2) Kennedy’s certainty that airing his doubts about Vietnam 
would be politically perilous going into the 1964 presidential campaign. 
Kennedy endorsed National Security Memorandum (NSM) 263 on October 2, 
1963, which called for withdrawal of 1,000 US troops by year’s end.  But the 1,000 
troops were only a first step toward withdrawal of most US forces within just over 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 3(2), C. Johnson, p.83-110. 
91 
two years.  Kennedy also directed Taylor, by then Joint Chiefs Chairman, to send a 
memorandum to services’ heads, dated October 4, indicating: 
The program currently in progress to train Vietnamese forces will be 
reviewed and accelerated as necessary to insure that all essential 
functions visualized to be required for the projected operational 
environment, to include those now performed by U.S. military units and 
personnel, can be assumed properly by the Vietnamese by the end of 
calendar year 1965. All planning will be directed towards preparing 
RVN forces for the withdrawal of all U.S. special assistance units and 
personnel by the end of calendar year 1965. (Galbraith, 2003) (Italics 
added.) 
Ferguson leaves the misleading impression that initiative for this directive came 
from McNamara and Taylor, and hence lacked the strategic import of a presidential 
policy to withdraw from Vietnam.  (In fact, following Kennedy’s assassination on 
November 22, Taylor and McNamara led the policy reversal against the 
withdrawal directives (Newman, 1992; pp. 434-435). Ferguson then argues that the 
coup d’etat of November 1, 1963, against South Vietnam President Diem tied the 
US to Diem’s successors and hence left Kennedy implicitly responsible for the 
escalation of the US role even after his death (p. 590). Ferguson’s view puts him on 
a page with Kissinger, who, notwithstanding his previous harsh criticism of Diem, 
wrote in a memo to his political patron Nelson Rockefeller in late October: 
If we undermine the Diem regime, we are really doing the Viet Cong’s work 
for them… A public announcement by Secretary McNamara that we would 
withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of this year and the remainder by 1965 
must give comfort to the Vietcong (p. 592). 
The Diem coup showed the Kennedy Administration in disarray, with sharp 
differences among State, Defense, and CIA. But countervailing evidence indicates 
that the most important decisions lay in the future, going into 1965 (Logevall, 
1999; pp. 73-74, 376). Kennedy’s planned troop withdrawal was intended to move 
ahead despite the Diem coup, and notwithstanding the continued deterioration in 
the military situation during November. Newman cites three public items to 
corroborate this case. 1) In Kennedy’s press conference of November 14, he placed 
“bring[ing] Americans home” at the top of his objectives in Vietnam – the highest 
public priority he had ever given it. 2) In the same press statement, there was no 
provision for “winning the war” – a change from previous press conferences, 
including the most recent of September 12.  He instead referred “to permitting 
democratic forces in the country to operate” – a formulation “only a step away” 
from that of the Laos neutrality agreement of 1962. And 3) the secrecy requirement 
was lifted from the 1,000-man withdrawal announcement (Newman, 1992; pp. 
423-424, 426-427). 
Important studies of this topic, in addition to Newman’s, include Howard Jones, 
Death of a Generation (Jones, 2003), James W Douglass, JFK and the 
Unspeakable (Douglas, 2010), and James Galbraith’s Exit Vietnam (Galbraith, 
2003) – this list is incomplete.  Interesting corroborative evidence can be found in 
Robert McNamara, In Retrospect (1995), Peter Dale Scott, War Conspiracy (1972), 
Kenneth O’Donnell, Johnny: We Hardly Knew Ye (1972), Parker’s (2005) 
biography of John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador Galbraith’s (1969 and 1982) 
memoirs, and in Arthur Schlesinger’s interviews with Jacqueline Kennedy in the 
spring of 1964. Mrs. Kennedy emphasized a full year before the 1965 troop 
buildup that Lyndon Johnson did not share her late husband’s views on Indochina, 
and she thought it likely that he (Johnson) would make a hash of it (Kennedy, 
2011). Of these, only McNamara’s book is included in Ferguson’s otherwise 
extensive bibliography, while James Galbraith’s article is cited in a footnote (p. 
910 n128).   
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 3(2), C. Johnson, p.83-110. 
92 
Ferguson also omits what may have been the most important consequence of 
the Diem coup. Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, who was also assassinated in the 
November coup, had been leading secret negotiations during the summer of 1963 
with the Viet Cong and Hanoi, toward the goal of reaching an intra-Vietnam 
agreement that would include a US departure. French President Charles DeGaulle, 
by-passing Washington, directed his Ambassador Lalouette to build on efforts 
already underway in order to promote the concept of neutralization with the Diem 
brothers – who were receptive. There is plausible evidence that the Viet Cong and 
Hanoi did not launch an offensive that summer in the face of Buddhist agitation 
against Diem because they did not want to upset negotiations (Jones, 2003; pp. 
310-313, 344-346). On August 29, DeGaulle publicly announced the French 
initiative, which drew diplomatic support from India, Poland, Italy and the Vatican.  
Kennedy responded in a TV interview with Walter Cronkite a few days later that 
the US was not interested - an answer likely intended to deflect criticism from 
hardliners at home. The very credible Vietnam journalist and historian Bernard 
Fall, based on discussions with Ho Chi Minh and other DRV (Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam) officials, declared in late September1963 that Hanoi was then 
amenable to a delay in reunification. The alternative – war with the US – would 
have cost Hanoi its delicately sustained independence vis-à-vis China (Logevall, 
1999; p. 348). 
Although some in Washington considered such an initiative to be a betrayal of 
trust, Ambassador Nolting wanted the talks to continue, and apparently persuaded 
the White House not to interfere. Ambassador Galbraith, who was trying early in 
1963 to advance the negotiations from his post in New Delhi, indicated in his 
memoirs that Kennedy encouraged his efforts (Galbraith, 1982; p. 478). Interest in 
a settlement continued even after the assassinations of the Diems and Kennedy.  
Senators Mansfield and Richard Russell advised President Johnson to embrace 
DeGaulle’s call for a neutral Vietnam (Logevall, 1992; pp. 81-828); the influential 
journalist Walter Lippmann met with DeGaulle in December 1963, then endorsed 
the latter’s plan in-person to Johnson on his return to the US (Logevall, 1992; pp. 
97-99). Rejecting such advice, Johnson soon cast his lot with hardliners.  In post-
Dallas discussions with Rockefeller, Kissinger encouraged a more aggressive 
posture in Vietnam, and appears not to have mentioned the DeGaulle initiative (pp. 
598-602). 
DeGaulle’s motives were mixed; even a failed effort to settle the Vietnam War 
would raise France’s diplomatic profile. His efforts to bring about neutralization 
agreements continued during 1964 and 1966 (pp. 704-705). Had the 1963 
diplomacy succeeded, US forces might have been asked to leave Vietnam, thereby 
saving infinite trouble – but frustrating some American Cold Warriors. We may 
speculate about what Kissinger’s position would have been – he does not mention 
the Nhu-Hanoi talks in his memoirs or in Diplomacy. We know from his efforts to 
find negotiating partners on behalf of the Johnson Administration during 1966 and 
1967 that Kissinger would have been receptive to efforts to use third- or fourth-
party leverage to advance negotiations, and he was more sympathetic to 
DeGaulle’s geopolitical revisionism than were most in Washington (Kissinger, 
1965). But given his view of the dynamics of international communism, and his 
reservations about the earlier neutrality agreement in Laos, it seems unlikely that 
Kissinger would have embraced a neutrality solution in Vietnam in 1963. In the 
event, Kennedy replaced Ambassador Nolting with Republican Henry Cabot Lodge 
in August of that year – a switch made in part to give Vietnam policy a bipartisan 
cover. Based on cable traffic, Lodge and other US officials were suspicious about 
what the Diems might negotiate with Hanoi (Newman, 1992; p. 384); the NY Times 
suggested that fear of a Gaullist neutralization of Vietnam lay behind US support 
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for the ouster of Diem (Logevall, 1992; pp. 85-869). This interpretation of events 
carries the implication that Lodge and his fellow coup plotters were acting without 
full buy-in from Kennedy. 
Kissinger’s own writings years and decades after the events parallel Ferguson’s 
incomplete account of the aftermath of the Diem and Kennedy assassinations.  
Kissinger leaves out complexities in Kennedy’s position on Vietnam, and makes 
little effort to look behind public statements. For example, in Kissinger’s account, 
the 1961 decision (NSAM-111) reinforced “momentum… clearly all in the 
direction of further [troop] increases, as Kennedy had not changed his assessment 
of what was at stake.” And he asserts that when Kennedy was assassinated “more 
[US military personnel] were in the pipeline” (Kissinger, 2003; pp. 33-34) 10– 
thereby dismissing the October 1963 decisions to withdraw troops 
In another sense, Ferguson is correct.  For two decades, the world was led to 
believe that Kennedy had gone “eyeball to eyeball” with Soviet Premier 
Khrushchev during the 1962 missile crisis – and won. Kennedy wanted the 
agreement over missiles in Turkey to remain secret, in part so as not to raise 
concerns about US commitments in NATO and elsewhere. The misleading 
impression would for years to come underlie a case for a strong response in 
Vietnam and elsewhere.  Indeed, Kennedy publicly made the case for holding the 
line in Vietnam, despite privately, almost secretly, planning for extrication. His 
vice president was not privy to his thinking on either the missile crisis or Vietnam 
(Kennedy probably intended to replace Johnson on the ticket in 1964 (Caro, 
2012)). Hardliners in and outside the Administration were encouraged.  For 
example, Deputy National Security Advisor Walt Rostow – who was not a member 
of the October 1962 EXCOMM11 – drew the incorrect lesson from the Cuban 
missile crisis “that the communists do not escalate in response to our actions” (p. 
587). 
In his defense, and not mentioned by Ferguson, Kennedy did telegraph a shift in 
direction in his commencement address at American University in June 1963. In a 
substantial change from Cold Warrior themes of his 1961 Inaugural Address, 
Kennedy now asked that “every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes 
to bring peace, should begin by looking inward – by examining his own attitude 
toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the 
cold war and toward freedom and peace here at home.” Its emotional thrust was to 
prepare for an end to the cold war – not to fight it, and certainly not to encourage 
Washington’s hawks. This speech got more attention abroad than in the US; the 
Soviet Union allowed broadcast of the entire speech.   In subsequent weeks, the US 
and Soviets reached agreement on the Test-Ban Treaty. 
Kissinger surely understood stirrings toward a different direction in the cold 
war, but he was unmoved regarding strategy in Vietnam. As Morgenthau tartly put 
it in 1969: “I opposed the war, while Kissinger supported it” (p. 581).  Why? 
 
4. Kissinger’s Early Views on Vietnam 
For Kissinger, Vietnam was usually about geopolitics.  In a 1955 piece for 
Foreign Affairs, he speculated that, despite the Geneva Agreement and French 
departure the year before, an “all-out American effort might still save Laos and 
Cambodia.” He added that we should make sure that countries at risk have 
“indigenous governments of sufficient stability” to prevent Soviet subversion (p. 
339). In memoranda to Rockefeller in February and April of 1962, Kissinger 
argued that failure to defend South Vietnam might have doleful consequences, and 
called for political and tactical measures to defeat the guerilla movement (pp. 588-
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589). He remained forthright about his concerns over the advance of communist 
powers, and wrote after leaving office: 
Washington policymakers had good reason to be concerned about the 
conquest of Indochina by a movement which had already engulfed eastern 
Europe and taken over China.  Regardless of whether Communist expansion 
was centrally organized, it seemed to possess enough momentum to sweep 
the fragile new nations of Southeast Asia into the anti-Western camp.  The 
real question was not whether some dominoes might fall in Southeast Asia, 
which was likely, but whether there might be a better place to draw the line 
(Kissinger, 2003; p. 19). 
Kissinger wrote in 1950 that the Soviet Union was “an uncompromising 
revolutionary power – a power with whom no kind of peaceful equilibrium could 
be attained.” (p. 316) John Mearsheimer, an academic “offensive realist” of a later 
generation, made the somewhat different point that “no responsible Soviet leader 
would have passed up an opportunity to be Europe’s hegemon in the wake of 
World War II” (Mearsheimer, 2014; p. 198). (A revolutionary power is one that 
will not accept limits, and that cannot be reassured of its security, hence is outside 
the constraints of normal diplomacy.  For a power to seek regional hegemony, by 
contrast, does not necessarily imply loosening of such constraints.) Yet Ferguson 
tells us that Kissinger, even before Stalin’s death in 1953, saw “mounting 
evidence” that the Soviet Union was becoming less revolutionary, and more a 
status-quo power (p.309).  He wrote to his colleague Schlesinger in 1954 that while 
he thought peace would never “break out… so that tensions would magically 
disappear,” he nevertheless believed that it “would be [un]wise to fight any more 
Koreas” (pp. 323-324). 
Ferguson notes, citing Kissinger, that Austria’s Metternich saw Restoration-era 
political crises in Spain, Naples and Piedmont as system-threatening menaces to his 
new order, demanding intervention. Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, meanwhile, 
understood Britain’s role as that of an offshore balancer, and hence was to engage 
in an ongoing process of adjustment – shifting its weight in favor of or against one 
small or large power against another.  Kissinger argued in 1953, and frequently 
since then, that the US also should act as a British-style balancer (p. 321). Where 
the Austrian Metternich worried about uprisings in the periphery, for the British the 
greater danger was that intervention in distant places could itself cause systemic 
unbalance (pp. 307-308). There is no antecedent in this analysis for a large-scale 
intervention by America a century-and-a-half later in a location geographically 
removed from its vital interests! 
Kissinger was also a critic of military containment against a revolutionary 
Soviet Union, which he felt was too demanding a strategy, as it forced the US to 
respond in settings of Moscow’s choosing (pp. 314-315). Kissinger came to 
prominence in the mid-1950s as an advocate of limited war as an alternatives to 
general nuclear war, including under some circumstances, limited nuclear war – 
including such weapons “clean and for tactical use” (p. 472). The psychology of 
the nuclear standoff was much on his mind, including concern that the threat even 
of limited nuclear war would lead US allies to re-calculate their interests and go 
over to the Soviet side. The need to calibrate threats, and to make nuclear threats 
credible, was paramount. Ferguson’s account also shows that Kissinger’s view of 
the Soviet Union stiffened, so that he by 1961 saw a need to stand up to Soviet 
encroachments anywhere and everywhere – even, apparently, in settings “not of 
Washington’s choosing.” To meet such heightened concerns, he told Rockefeller, 
the US needed to be prepared to go to general, rather than limited, war; “nuclear 
weapons,” he reassured, “have preserved civilization” (p. 472). For Kissinger, 
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diplomacy almost everywhere was becoming subsumed under requirements of US-
Soviet relations. 
A televised December 1965 debate was embarrassing, and revealing.  Teamed 
with two Harvard Law students against future Labour Party leader Michael Foot 
and writer and journalist Tariq Ali representing Oxford, Kissinger said, “It is my 
belief that the United States should accept the [1954] Geneva settlement as a basis 
for the settlement of the present war… and it is my impression that the American 
Government has indicated its readiness to do so” (pp. 671-672). In fact, the 1954 
settlement had called for the temporary division of Vietnam, with internationally 
supervised elections and reunification to follow. Because it opposed reunification, 
the US government had not signed the agreement, and the Johnson administration – 
which had blocked Vietnam neutralization talks in 1964 -- was not about to reverse 
policy. Good high school debaters would have known this much in December 
1965. Oxford’s side won the debate. An obvious inference is that Kissinger’s 
support for the US war effort at that point had much to do with his power 
calculations elsewhere and very little to do with understanding of events in 
Vietnam. 
Intertwined with Kissinger’s geopolitics, he was a political conservative, with a 
dread of the disorder and chaos that revolution might bring.  In World Order, he 
argued that internal upheaval could “shake the international equilibrium more 
profoundly than aggression from abroad”. He added that “the more sweeping the 
change, the more violence is needed to reconstruct authority, without which society 
will disintegrate” (Kissinger, 2014b; p.41).  Ferguson describes him in the 1950s 
and 1960s as a Burkean conservative, who understood history to be driven by 
nations and peoples – hence statesmen would have to draw on such forces to 
prevent chaos (p. 298).  
In this context, Kissinger was also a reliable anti-communist, although he 
preferred to express it otherwise.  From an interview with reporter Mike Wallace in 
1958: 
I believe, for instance, that we reacted very wrongly to the riot in Latin 
America [an illusion to the protests sparked by Vice President Nixon’s visits 
to Peru and Venezuela the previous May]. Rather than saying, “These are 
Communist-inspired and we must keep Latin America from going 
Communist,” we should have said, “This recalls us to our duty. These are 
things we want to do because of the values we stand for, not because we want 
to beat the Communists” (pp. 415-416). 
The Kantian language of ethical decision is unmistakable. According to notes from 
an April 1961 meeting with Rockefeller, and in similar spirit, Kissinger allowed 
that opposing communism was a moral duty – one that would justify taking tens of 
thousands of lives in order to save millions that would be lost in the event of 
communist victories. Noting that communists would often advance using 
infiltration and subversion, he said it “was not our moral concept to act against it, 
but it should be… We can’t demand perfection before action… Let’s face up to the 
question of who[m] we support: let’s defend the bastards and reform them later” 
(pp. 472-473). Kissinger’s motivation regarding Vietnam rested significantly on 
concern about communism and insurrection – which, as Ferguson argues, had more 
to do with duty-driven idealism (misguided or not) than with the cynical realism 
often attributed to him. Kissinger’s commentaries on revolution and stability would 
be off-key coming from such less-ideological realists as DeGaulle, Morgenthau or 
Mearsheimer. 
There is a larger question here that Ferguson does not and Kissinger did not 
sufficiently answer. Did pressure from the Soviet Union require that every part of 
the world be drawn into superpower competition? Was it really in the US’ interest 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 3(2), C. Johnson, p.83-110. 
96 
to pressure nonaligned countries to enter security agreements?  To take one 
example, under a Dulles initiative, the US entered a bilateral security pact with 
Pakistan against the Soviet Union. But as nearly every account of Pakistan’s 
history makes clear, its leadership was obsessed about competition with India, 
including in the Kashmir, and agreed to align itself with the US in order to obtain 
material and diplomatic support against India, not against the Soviet Union. An 
important consequence of the Pakistan pact was to put US diplomacy at 
loggerheads with post-colonial India, the world’s largest non-aligned power – 
which almost inevitably led India to seek military and diplomatic support from the 
Soviets. Senator Kennedy had again opposed the thrust of US cold war policy in 
calling in 1958 for closer and more extensive ties with India (Parker, 2005; p. 379).  
His decision to send Galbraith to New Dehli in 1961 was a follow-up on his earlier 
interest in bringing about improved relations.  
As further examples, US intervention against democratically elected 
governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), and support for the 
assassination of similarly elected President Lumumba of the Congo at the end of 
the Eisenhower Administration were all driven by opposition to neutralism 
(Mahoney, 1983), or by the premise that nonalignment was an implicit boost to 
Soviet interests. Other evidence indicates US efforts to support right-leaning, pro-
US factions in Italy and France during the 1950s and into the 1960s, either 
officially or through covert channels (Talbot, 2015). This way of thinking -- the 
expectation that every government should be lined up either with the US or, 
otherwise implicitly, against it -- lay at the heart of the urgency in US national 
security circles about supporting the Saigon-based government in Vietnam. 
Kissinger views were nuanced enough for him to be sympathetic to Gaullist re-
assertion of an independent French defense policy during the 1960s (pp. 704f, 
717f). When the time arrived a few years later for “triangular” diplomacy with 
China and the Soviets, Kissinger proved adept at dealing with multi-polar 
geopolitics. But Ferguson’s evidence leads us to the unexpected conclusion that 
Kissinger’s thought-framework regarding the world’s post-colonial periphery was 
implicitly bi-polar during most of the 1950s and 1960s. Ferguson’s speaks of 
Kissinger in 1967 confronting the “absurd predicament of the US in Vietnam” (p. 
727) – as though Kissinger had not himself argued in favor of deeper involvement 
at almost every turn. Kissinger and sometimes Ferguson depict Kennedy as a 
straightforward Cold Warrior, perhaps doing so as a buffer to soften the hardline 
nature of Kissinger’s own preferences. Screening out Kennedy’s new directions, 
and his decision to implement the first stage of withdrawal – not to mention 
omitting the multi-lateral 1963 initiative to negotiate an intra-Vietnam settlement -- 
leaves an impression that Kissinger faced a narrower set of choices regarding 
Vietnam policy, and was a more resourceful thinker, than were in fact the case. 
 
5. Kissinger, Morgenthau and Negotiations 
Morgenthau blasted the premises of official strategy, which were similar to 
Kissinger’s premises. Like most realists, Morgenthau intended to navigate the 
world with its human flaws, and did not share Kissinger’s fear of contagion from 
chaos and revolution.  He noted: 
If one probes beneath the rationalizations for our military presence in South 
Vietnam, one finds as the dominant motivation the fear that if South Vietnam 
should go Communist, [then] no nation threatened by Communism would 
entrust its protection to us… This theory… is unsupported by any historic 
evidence.  The Soviet Union went Communist in 1917 and China in 1949, 
but no other nation followed suit. In 1945, Poland and Hungary went 
Communist, but Finland did not, and all the Balkan states went Communist, 
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but Greece did not.  In 1948, Czechoslovakia went Communist, but no other 
nation did. In 1954 North Vietnam went communist all by itself, and in 1960 
or so Cuba went communist without being followed by any other Latin 
American nation.  Social and, more particularly, revolutionary change is not a 
mechanical result of imitation and prestige but of objective conditions 
peculiar to individual nations (Morgenthau, 1965; pp. 77-78). 
Morgenthau wrote of telling South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem 
during a visit in 1955 that his governance was driving the population to political 
frustration and indifference, and that the only organized opportunity for opposition 
would be through the Communist underground. That is, it was Diem – not some 
congeries of international forces – that was making South Vietnam into a potential 
communist “domino” (Morgenthau, 1965; pp. 29-30). Diem’s draconian Decree 
10/59, issued in May 1959, expanded the scope for arbitrary imprisonment and 
execution for “political crimes,” and led many marginal adherents of revolution 
into full-time support of the National Liberation Front (Elliott, 2003; pp. 101-105). 
Morgenthau raised another argument against the Vietnam War, which is that it 
could only be fought by morally unacceptable methods.  He wrote: 
If the war in the South were to last long enough, we would have a good 
chance of winning it.  We were not likely to win it in the traditional way by 
breaking the enemy’s will to resist, but rather by killing so many of the 
enemy that there is nobody left to resist…. Hence, the “body count,” however 
fictitious, becomes the sole measure of our success.  No civilized nation can 
wage such a war without suffering incalculable moral damage (Morgenthau, 
1969b; pp. 137-138). 
Morgenthau’s scenario was not literally realized as South Vietnam’s population 
grew rapidly throughout the war, despite casualties. He meant that a war of the 
kind the US was fighting in Vietnam necessarily imposed heavy costs on the local 
population. Accounts do suggest that Saigon’s often improved military position in 
the years after the Tet Offensive of 1968 owed much to a policy of “draining the 
pond to catch the fish” -- a phrase used by both General Westmoreland and CIA 
Director Colby. It was a policy of using air power, artillery, and other military 
measures deliberately to create internal flight  (Elliott, 2003; pp. 337-340). 
Kissinger was consistent in his view that such moral and human rights 
considerations in Vietnam were trumped by geopolitical requirements.  He told 
Look magazine in August 1966 that the war in Vietnam was “a crucial test of 
American maturity… We do not have the privilege of deciding to meet only those 
challenges which most flatter our moral preconceptions” (p. 672). He responded in 
his memoirs to a “proclamation of America’s immorality” from Morgenthau 
similar to the one above by observing: “In the post-World War II period, America 
had been fortunate to have never had to choose between its moral convictions and 
its strategic analysis” (Kissinger, 2003; p. 44). Kissinger thus falls back to his 
comfort zone, a Kantian choosing-among-conflicting-imperatives framework.  It is 
weak response, as it implies that Morgenthau, a preeminent diplomatic scholar and, 
like Kissinger, a Jewish émigré from Europe during the 1930, was unskilled at 
weighing moral against strategic imperatives. 
Notwithstanding sympathy for his subject, Ferguson acknowledges that 
Kissinger was wrong about the Vietnam War and Morgenthau was right. Far from 
accepting Kissinger’s geopolitical concern about the expansion of the communist 
bloc, Morgenthau argued that a unified, nationalist Vietnam would be a constraint 
on Chinese power. To explain Kissinger’s failure, Ferguson goes back to his 
opening argument – that Kissinger was an idealist, who believed that South 
Vietnam’s geopolitical importance and its “right to self-determination” were worth 
American lives. Losing the argument with Morgenthau was, as Ferguson sees it, 
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part of Kissinger’s education, a step toward becoming the more open realist he 
would became (pp. 822-823).  
Morgenthau argued by June 1965 that it was too late simply to withdraw from 
Vietnam, because it would “do great damage to US prestige” (which he defined as 
its “reputation for power,”) hence that the US must negotiate its withdrawal 
(Morgenthau, 1965; pp. 9, 79-80). His view appeared close to where Kissinger’s 
had by then evolved, as the latter realized even before his first trip to Vietnam in 
October 1965 that chances for a military solution were vanishingly small. Indeed, 
as early as December 1965, McNamara had reached a similar view, and staggered 
Johnson by telling him privately that chances for a military victory were only 
between a third and 50 percent “no matter what we do” (p. 675). This juxtaposition 
of views suggests consensus on the need to negotiate an exit.  Nevertheless, the US 
troop buildup, which had reached about 180,000 by end-1965, would treble to an 
early 1969 peak level at over 500,000 –yet still with no negotiated settlement in 
sight. 
The apparent agreement was misleading, as it masked different views of what 
should be negotiated. Kissinger’s meeting in September 1965 with John 
McNaughton, an assistant secretary of defense, was revealing. McNaughton 
indicated that in no scenario, and at no force level, were US chances of “winning” 
higher than 40 percent.  In every case, he went on, the greatest probability went to 
a “compromise outcome which would have the essential characteristic of 
recognized VC [Viet Cong] areas”. Kissinger, almost dumbfounded, replied that 
“the VC in these conditions might well take over the country”. McNaughton, 
undeterred, replied that the US were going to have to abandon those it was 
supporting, and that if Kissinger wanted to be “really constructive”, he could 
prepare a paper on the best way to do it (p. 635). Kissinger heard similar analyses 
from others, and was then bemused and appalled when General Westmoreland and 
others in Vietnam spun their briefings to tell him of battlefield and “pacification” 
successes (p. 649). 
McNaughton briefed McNamara on the same discouraging data. But Defense 
civilians were constrained by senior military opinion, which loudly opposed 
scaling back war aims. Walt Rostow, soon to replace Bundy as national security 
advisor, supported military views against the civilians. Internal study findings were 
closely held, and considerations of alternatives inside the Johnson Administration 
was stilted (pp. 636-637); disarray regarding Vietnam policy had worsened from 
the already impaired level it had reached during the Kennedy Administration. The 
US war continued and intensified – ending in McNamara’s departure from the 
Department of Defense, Johnson’s decision not to run again, and election of a 
Republican president in 1968. 
When Morgenthau recommended negotiations in 1965, he recognized the same 
facts on the ground that McNaughton had laid out to Kissinger. He advocated 
retreating to a few coastal bases, to maintain some negotiating leverage – and then 
essentially agreeing to Vietnamese reunification as a neutralist, but communist-
dominated, state (Morgenthau, 1965; p. 80). He privately reiterated his view in 
October 1968, indicating that it would be impossible to liquidate the war “while 
maintaining one’s original justifications for the war”.  The real issue, he added, “is 
who shall govern, the Communists or the opponents?” (p. 821-822). 
DeGaulle’s conclusions were similar to Morgenthau’s – the forces of national 
self-determination could not be suppressed, so the US should withdraw and 
embrace neutralization (implicitly to include a communist-dominated government 
in the South) (Logevall, 1992; pp. 75-77). Ferguson notes that David Nes, briefly 
Lodge’s deputy at the US Embassy in Saigon during 1964, “came to realize that 
DeGaulle was offering a choice preferable to military escalation” (pp. 705-706). 
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DeGaulle’s agenda regarding Vietnam was unwelcome to many because, as 
someone at Quai D’Orsay explained to Kissinger in May 1965, it also served the 
geopolitical objective of reducing the American role in the world (p. 722). A 
reduced US role may have been a necessary pill to swallow. As Bismarck had 
understood a century earlier, Kissinger was later to observe that a balance of power 
requires “a common recognition of limits” (Kissinger, 2014b; p. 371). To take on 
an ideological war on the world’s periphery perhaps exceeded those limits. 
Ferguson sheds light on Washington’s effort to begin negotiations with Hanoi 
during 1967. The Johnson Administration selected Kissinger to open negotiations 
with Hanoi using French intermediaries, but the effort went nowhere. There has 
been controversy over the years about why, with McNamara, among others, 
arguing later that the US administration was not committed to the effort. We now 
know from Vietnamese sources, Ferguson tells us, that Hanoi had no intention of 
making peace in 1967 (pp. 732-733). That is true, but also misleading. As 
DeGaulle, McNaughton and Morgenthau had by then argued for years, and as 
McNamara had already briefed Johnson, the US had little prospect of defeating 
North Vietnam militarily. The US had no reason to expect to obtain at the 
negotiating table what it had scant prospect of winning on the battlefield.   
Kissinger’s (1979) memoirs leave the impression that he and Nixon left no 
stone unturned to reach an agreement after their administration arrived in January 
1969. He even described his own position, in November 1968, as “not very 
different” from Morgenthau’s – which the latter disputed (p. 822). In fact, as 
Kissinger summarizes in World Order, the Administration had “one irreducible 
condition”: it would not agree to begin negotiations by replacing the government of 
South Vietnam (Kissinger, 2014b; pp. 300-301). This reasonable-sounding 
condition actually ruled out negotiation for a settlement, just as it made contacts 
with Hanoi unlikely in 1967. Kissinger’s subsequent accounts have not been 
accurate. Unmentioned in either his memoirs or in his 2014 book, Kissinger 
prepared a memorandum to Nixon in October 1972 (declassified in 2010) calling 
for two-party talks between the US and Hanoi, perhaps using the Soviet Union as 
an intermediary. The proposal implicitly acknowledges weakness of the Republic 
of Vietnam (RVN), survival of which would have been an early casualty of such 
negotiations.  Nixon shortly afterward wrote to RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu 
to tell him that Washington was going to reach an agreement with Hanoi, whether 
or not Thieu was on board (Woodward, 2015). 12  In these communications, 
Kissinger and Nixon evidently recognized what had been clear to others for at least 
a half-dozen years. 
Looking ahead, Kissinger as national security advisor negotiated the Paris 
Accords with North Vietnam by January 1973, which in fact left the RVN 
government in place in Saigon.  One view is that this agreement was a success for 
US diplomacy, and that pessimists were wrong. (Sorley, 1999; Kissinger, 2014b; p. 
301)13 (In this view, the North Vietnamese takeover in 1975 followed on a collapse 
of US will to provide material or air support to its ally.) As we have learned more 
about Kissinger’s and Nixon’s own doubts in 1972 regarding the viability of the 
RVN, that argument has become less plausible. An alternative view, advanced by 
Mearsheimer (2014; p. 105), is that Hanoi agreed to leave the RVN in place 
because Northern officials thought that the fastest way to get the US to leave the 
country. At that point, North Vietnamese troops would be in a position to 
overthrow the RVN unobstructed, as they indeed would do less than two-and-a-half 
years later.  Vietnam historian William Duiker argues that on balance… Hanoi had 
the better of the Paris deal, for the US withdrawal was not matched by a similar 
pullback [from South Vietnam] by the PAVN [Peoples’ Army of Vietnam]. He 
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also indicates that the Communists held a stronger political position in the South 
than did the weakened RVN (Duiker, 1981; p. 297). 
6. Vietnam and Credibility 
Over and again, Kissinger has stressed the importance of maintaining credibility 
of US commitments. Indeed, maintaining credibility seemed sometimes to stand 
alone as a reason for persisting in policy, independent of geopolitical competition 
or fear of domestic upheavals in the unaligned regions of the world. After breaking 
his formal relationship with it in 1963, Kissinger argued that the Kennedy 
administration was undermining the US reputation for reliability - “the most 
important asset any nation has”. He wrote in Foreign Affairs, January 1969, 
“However we got into Vietnam, whatever the judgment of our actions, ending the 
war honorably is essential for the peace of the world.  Any other solution may 
unloose forces that would complicate prospects of international order” (p. 843). 
Almost 40 years after leaving office, he summarized the view of the Nixon 
administration: 
[President Nixon] thought it his responsibility [to end the war] in the context 
of America’s global commitments for sustaining the postwar international 
order…  America could not jettison its security commitments in one part of 
the world without provoking challenges to its resolve in others. The 
preservation of American credibility in defense of its allies and the global 
system of order – a role the United States had performed for two decades - 
remained an integral part of Nixon’s calculations (Kissinger, 2014b; p. 
300).14 
This and similar arguments have come under sharp criticism in the political 
science literature. Jonathan Mercer (1996) studied several military crises to 
conclude that when a country backs down enemies do not make judgements about 
its “character”, but instead assume that such decisions are made in response to 
“situations”.  Daryl Press (2005) examined pre-World War II “appeasement”, the 
Berlin crises and the Cuban missile crisis to determine how high-stakes security 
decisions are reached. He concluded that leaders make decisions based on their 
judgement about their opponents’ interests and relative power. Opponents’ “past 
actions” – the crux of the credibility argument – are much less important.  Looking 
at the US experience in Vietnam, Press noted: 
By fighting wars to preserve their country’s credibility, leaders are expending 
power – which really does affect credibility – to build reputation, which does 
not seem to affect credibility…. The American decision to fight the Vietnam 
War provides a clear example of leaders making this mistake.  They believed 
that losing South Vietnam might reduce US credibility to defend NATO.  
Therefore they decided to defend South Vietnam in order to hedge against 
possible losses to America’s reputation. But in doing so, they seriously 
reduced American power.  As a result of Vietnam, the US military was less 
prepared to defend core US interests from 1970 to 1980 than at virtually any 
other point in the Cold War (Press, 2005; p. 159). 
Morgenthau (whom Press cites) earlier offered similar illustrations, noting for 
example that France’s reputation for power rose after if liquidated losing 
enterprises in Indochina in 1954 and Algeria in 1962. Similarly, he noted, 
America’s Bay of Pigs debacle of 1961 weighed little in the scales of US prestige. 
(Morgenthau, 1965; p. 11)  Where Kissinger speaks of forces that might have been 
“unloosened” by withdrawal from Vietnam, we should also acknowledge 
countervailing damages, both inside the US and in the coin of international 
reputation, that resulted from not withdrawing.  This might further be the case 
given widespread opposition to the war among US allies, especially in Europe. 
In both the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Kissinger 
was frustrated that, in his view, Kennedy had backed down too easily. In the case 
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of Cuba, Kissinger’s disappointment rested on US acquiescence in a continued 
Soviet military presence on the island; he did not then know of the Cuban-for-
Turkish missiles swap, which would have dismayed him further. Kissinger’s main 
focus at that time was Europe, and his concern - shared by the influential Dean 
Acheson, among others - was that the US nuclear guarantee for European security 
might collapse if the US were seen as unreliable (pp. 494-495). As he expressed it 
in the 1958 Wallace interview cited earlier: 
If the Soviet Union attacks and in fact we are very much more afraid of total 
war than they are -- they will gradually blackmail the free world into 
surrender.  Everything that I say is based on the assumption that we are as 
willing to run risks as the Soviet Union.  If this is not the case, we are lost, 
and I think we ought to face that fact (p. 413). 
To somewhat reduce the downside odds in making strategic choices, Kissinger 
contributed to the ongoing dialog about building capacity for “flexible response”; 
but flexible alternatives were unsatisfactory in Berlin, in part because Soviet 
conventional strength in central Europe exceeded NATO’s. The nuclear guarantee 
– based on US readiness to go to either a limited or general nuclear war – raised 
nearly unanswerable questions about the willingness of the US to take action that 
might lead to millions of casualties. Uncertainty about the US commitment, in turn, 
fed French and German fears, which undermined the credibility of NATO, led to 
demands for a European nuclear force separate from NATO, and might offer 
diplomatic openings to the Soviets. It also raised the specter of a US-Soviet deal 
with the potential to subordinate the national security interests of western European 
nations. 
Kennedy was ready to suffer a loss in US prestige, or to open some doubt about 
US reliability, if that was the cost of avoiding a nuclear exchange. Ferguson 
summarizes that Kennedy “simply had not been convinced that a limited war, or a 
conventional war, could be fought that would not rapidly escalate to an all-out 
nuclear war.” So he looked for a way out (p. 513). Ferguson concludes that 
Kennedy acted as the realist while Kissinger was an idealist – and that Kennedy 
was right (p. 558).  
This was a context for US decisions leading to the buildup in Vietnam. While 
instigating a conventional war over Berlin or Cuba would have been perilous in the 
extreme, the stakes in Vietnam during the 1960s were not going to be high enough 
to trigger a nuclear showdown. Paradoxically, the US then chose to fight a 
conventional war in what Ferguson describes as “a strategically inconsequential 
former French colony” (p. 577). Some US officials anticipated that evidence of 
commitment in Vietnam would ricochet to improve US credibility in Europe.   
Kissinger, visiting Germany in a semi-official capacity in January 1967, 
suggested to a formally retired (but still engaged) Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
that a US defeat in Vietnam would make it easier for East German leader Walter 
Ulbricht to put pressure on Berlin.  As Kissinger reported back to Washington, the 
argument did not impress: 
Adenauer looked at me and said, and do you think that I believe that you will 
protect us?  I said, yes.  He said, I no longer believe that you will protect us.  
Your actions over recent years have made clear that to you détente [with the 
Soviet Union] is more important than anything else (p. 716). 
This exchange illustrates the logic of the political science criticisms cited earlier. 
Adenauer (and other Germans, across the political spectrum,) did not believe it was 
in the US interest to fight a nuclear war over Berlin, or even over Western Europe, 
and they would look for other means to advance their security. The US war in 
Vietnam amounted to an effort to roll back the clock, an effort to get NATO 
partners to take their places under a superpower-led order. What happened in 
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Vietnam scarcely affected calculations of American power and interest – except to 
the extent the Germans considered the war a moral and political disaster, and a 
distraction from matters closer to their concern (pp. 712-713). 
Evidence from France was similar. In a 1964 article, Kissinger described 
DeGaulle as “so certain of [America’s military commitment to Europe] that he 
does not consider [French] political independence a risk.” While no European 
country joined the US effort in Vietnam, DeGaulle in fact worked against stated 
US interests there -suggesting that Vietnam should be considered as within a 
Chinese sphere of influence.  DeGaulle thought he could advance such a multi-
polar view of power relations in Asia without undermining the US security 
commitment to Europe (pp. 704-705).  
When Kissinger, as Nixon’s national security advisor, was summoned by 
DeGaulle after a dinner at the Elysee Palace in February 1969, he was greeted with 
the question “Why don’t you get out of Vietnam?” 
“Because,” I replied, “a sudden withdrawal might give us a credibility 
problem.” 
“Where?” the General wanted to know.  I mentioned the Middle East. 
“How very odd,” said the General from a foot above me.  “It is precisely in 
the Middle East that I thought your enemies had the credibility problem” 
(Kissinger, 1979; p. 110). 
Kissinger does not record an answer to DeGaulle at the time, nor do his 
memoirs indicate how he might have responded. Indeed, he seems to have treated 
the General’s query in the manner of an eccentric aside from a creative genius. But 
Kissinger’s subsequent account buttressed DeGaulle’s insight. Soviet reputation 
was damaged by military losses of its clients Egypt and Syria to the Israelis in 
1967, and Moscow sought an opportunity to recoup. Kissinger advised Nixon less 
than a month after the conversation with DeGaulle: 
In my opinion… we were more likely to obtain Soviet cooperation in 
Vietnam by moving deliberately [that is, very slowly] in the Middle East, 
where the Soviet clients were the weaker party, than by relieving its 
embarrassment through talks that would give the Soviets a dazzling 
opportunity to demonstrate their utility to their Arab friends (Kissinger, 1979; 
p. 352). 
Kissinger’s analysis put a paradoxical light on the credibility matter. As 
DeGaulle had said, the Soviets lacked credibility in the Middle East.  But because 
the US needed Soviet pressure against Hanoi, the US would have to take some 
measured action to restore Soviet credibility in the Mideast as a quid pro quo. 
Imagine a counterfactual in which the US had allowed its Saigon allies to be 
replaced, and then departed Vietnam. In that case, the US would not have been 
obliged to look for a favor from the Soviets in Southeast Asia, and hence would not 
have had to make concessions to them in the Middle East. Quite plausibly, 
therefore, US persistence in Vietnam could have weakened US credibility in the 
Middle East, just as it could have increased Soviet credibility.  
In the event, US Middle East diplomacy in subsequent years advanced 
American interests. Soviet credibility did not recover, and Kissinger commented to 
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in March of the same year that the Soviet 
government’s Mideast policy guaranteed its clients “only stalemate or military 
defeat” (Kissinger, 1979; p. 1252). Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would expel 
15,000 Soviet advisors in July 1972. The Soviets had a number of reasons for 
holding back from endorsing its clients’ positions in 1972 - including concern 
about Israeli military strength, and their need for US support in ratification of new 
German treaties as well as for US grain. Kissinger, returning to the credibility 
issue, added: 
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Our demonstration of firmness on India-Pakistan and on Vietnam (not to 
mention the conflicts [in Jordan] in the autumn of 1970) must have convinced 
the Soviets that one more crisis would overload the circuit (Kissinger, 1979; 
p. 1297). 
All three of these conflicts imposed material and diplomatic burdens on the US.  
Kissinger’s argument seems to be that burdening US diplomatic and material 
resources can have a second-order effect in strengthening US credibility. Did he 
mean that US credibility in the Middle East would have been less if the US had left 
Vietnam years earlier because there would then have been no need to demonstrate 
“firmness”?  (This is the logic of what he told DeGaulle!) Surely, Sadat as well as 
the Soviets by 1972 were calculating US power and interests at stake in the Middle 
East, as the political science literature suggests – rather than reliving whatever 
decisions the US had taken years earlier in Southeast Asia. 
Ferguson describes Antonin Snejdarek, director of a Czech research institute, as 
providing Kissinger with a “master class” in geopolitics induring the latter’s visit in 
September 1966.  Snejdarek detailed tensions within Communist bloc countries, 
and then argued that the US war in Vietnam “might be a convenient pretext [for 
Moscow] to tighten control over Eastern Europe”. This was not a one-off insight, 
as Ferguson mentions that other Czech scholars were saying nearly the same thing 
(pp. 738, 740, 745-746). Ferguson narrates this discussion as part of Kissinger’s 
education, part of the process by which he became more “realist”, and more 
inclined to make diplomatic approaches to Moscow or Beijing. But it also depicts 
an odd bias in Kissinger’s thought process: keeping US commitments was crucial 
for him, even if doing so strengthened the Soviets’ geopolitical leverage.   
Beyond “idealism,” beyond his choice of policy maxims, Kissinger’s 
willingness to consider alternative frameworks seems to have bumped up against a 
hard constraint: his preference for order, even one in which the purported 
geopolitical opponent’s prerogatives were protected. Kissinger’s built-in 
conservativism left him inclined to view events as a bi-polarist Cold Warrior; his 
conclusions were in line with Washington’s predilections.  It becomes clearer why 
DeGaulle and Adenauer concluded that US policies implicitly advanced a US-
Soviet “condominium” at the expense of European interests.  Not for Kissinger was 
a Kennedy-esque move to end the Cold War -or a Reagan-like move to win it. 
 
7. Some Perspectives  
Ferguson intends his book as an account of Kissinger’s life and education 
through 1968, in the spirit of a Bildungsroman (p. 875). Historical verdicts on 
Kissinger will depend much more on what happened afterward.  Part of Ferguson’s 
story is that Kissinger overcame the rigidities of an early idealism, and came more 
to respect realists Bismarck, DeGaulle, and Morgenthau.15  But what stands out in 
gathering Kissinger’s views on the American role in Vietnam is how consistent 
they have been, from a Foreign Affairs article in 1955 to memoranda in the early 
1960s, through his time in the White House, his memoirs, and even to more recent 
writings.   
Kissinger was more willing than the presidents he served to risk nuclear war 
over Berlin or Cuba. He was prepared to absorb tens of thousands of deaths to 
advance the greater good, and he felt driven by an idealist imperative to advocate 
such exchanges. He was ready to slog on with the RVN in Vietnam, despite 
credible intelligence estimates that South Vietnam was unlikely to prevail under 
any circumstances - again, for the greater strategic good, of maintaining US 
credibility. He subordinated concern about justice and human rights violations in 
the war in Vietnam to considerations of the broader US power position. While his 
views on some of these might have changed after 1968, all appear to have been part 
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of his mental toolkit at the time he became Nixon’s national security advisor in 
January 1969 – and taken together they seem to overstate the strategic interest of 
the US in Vietnam, and are based on a view that subsumes most international 
politics into a bipolar US-Soviet competition by the 1960s. From the evidence 
Ferguson assembles, these reservations are not made only ex-post, but would have 
been reasonable in 1968. This reader reaches the unexpected conclusion that 
Kissinger did not become a realist soon enough. 
The Nixon Administration’s cardinal conceptual error in its Vietnam policy was 
to push aside what Kissinger should have understood by 1965 - that, given any 
plausible military scenario, Hanoi was not going to negotiate a settlement that 
would leave the RVN in power. Kissinger (2014b; pp. 301-302), decades later and 
somewhat backhandedly, acknowledged as much, noting that “contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the Nixon Administration overestimated the scope for 
negotiation (italics added). For the battle-hardened leadership in Hanoi… 
compromise was the same as defeat.”   
We know that the Soviet Union lost the Cold War, and that the US and the 
Soviets never traded nuclear attacks. Kissinger emphasized moral factors, and 
“ideals,” as decisive in the superpower competition (p. 25), and there is evidence 
that Soviet leadership and society were demoralized by the 1980s. Material factors 
also played a large role. Kissinger over-estimated Soviet economic power, as did 
many. The US won the competition because it and similarly situated countries had 
by far the more robust economic system, while the economic ascendance of East 
Asia left the Soviet Union looking passed-by. Soviet disintegration was accelerated 
by the collapse of oil prices in the middle-1980s, another material factor. Closer to 
security and diplomatic considerations, the US became quite effective at 
containment - in gathering and leading a coalition of dozens of countries – with the 
important, but limited, objective of blocking Soviet expansion in either Europe or 
Asia. Containment turned out to be robust enough to survive any loss of credibility 
resulting from concessions over Berlin and Cuba. Indeed, the threat of nuclear war 
over either was never really tenable, so backing away from it was an act of 
diplomatic realism that over time perhaps strengthened containment, not weakened 
it. 
Another argument holds that a US withdrawal from Vietnam would have led the 
Soviets to encourage more wars of national liberation (Turner, 2010; pp. 105-106). 
This argument is unconvincing, for two reasons.  First, given the extraordinary 
strain the Vietnam War brought to the US, the Soviets might have seen it in their 
interest to encourage more such wars - especially if they believed the US was 
committed to fighting them.  Second, the Soviets did subsequently encourage wars 
of national liberation - or, wars of communist opposition - in Afghanistan, Central 
America, and southern Africa. On the ledger of Cold War gains and losses, the 
outcomes of most of these went against the Soviets. Containment-after-Vietnam 
succeeded without large commitments of ground troops. 
What about Southeast Asia? Much of Asia has prospered since the last US 
helicopters left South Vietnam in 1975, and the region has avoided major war.  
Notwithstanding defeat of South Vietnam, did the prolonged US effort there 
contribute to laying a basis for political stability and long-term growth in the 
region?  The Economist (1978) ran a lead editorial, “The Bottle Stayed Corked,” 
arguing just that. Mark Moyar (2006; pp. 375ff) writes openly of the “domino 
effect,” and quotes a variety of senior politicians or military leaders in Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and India who said the US role in 
Vietnam was critical to stabilizing their own nations. According to Moyar, the 
Indonesian Army, encouraged by the US commitment in Vietnam, resisted 
President Sukarno, who by 1965 was making peace with Indonesia’s communist 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 3(2), C. Johnson, p.83-110. 
105 
party and collaborating with Chinese and Vietnamese communists. Moyar notes 
(with no hint of regret) that factions of the Indonesian Army led an effort that 
killed several hundred thousand communist party members in 1965 and resulted in 
their country becoming a “reliable friend” of the US.  Kissinger himself records 
that Lee Kwan Yew – 
the founder of the Singapore state and perhaps the wisest Asian leader of his 
period, was vocal in his firm belief, maintained to this writing [in 2014] that 
American intervention was indispensable to preserve the possibility of an 
independent Southeast Asia (Kissinger, 2014b; p. 297). 
The essence of these claims is that the US presence in South Vietnam “bought 
time”. The premise is that international communism had momentum in the early- 
and middle-1960s that would be lost by the early 1970s, a consequence of Sino-
Soviet split, the weakening of China as a result of the Cultural Revolution, Nixon’s 
détente with Soviet Union and diplomatic opening to China, and an improving 
economic outlook elsewhere in Asia. To be clear, this argument - Moyar’s, 
Kissinger’s, Yew’s -- can be made even though the US eventually lost in Vietnam, 
and it could be made even if it was understood all along that the US was likely to 
lose. The argument is precarious, but not necessarily wrong. It has been a persistent 
claim in favor of the Johnson and the Nixon-Kissinger policies in Vietnam. 
But there is contrary evidence. Ambassador Galbraith wrote later of attending a 
meeting in Washington on November 6, 1961, with Kennedy and Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in which the latter displayed indifference about UN or 
ICC16 involvement in Vietnam. Notwithstanding Moyar’s (2006; p. 382) inclusion 
of India in his list of countries where stability was enhanced by US intervention in 
Vietnam, Nehru repeated emphatically to Kennedy that the US should commit no 
military forces to that country (Galbraith, 1969; p. 214). This meeting took place in 
Washington at the height of internal contention following the Taylor mission about 
whether to commit US forces. Louis Joxe, the French minister who attended 
Nehru’s funeral in 1964, commented to DeGaulle afterward that Indians felt 
threatened, even “terrorized” by US initiatives that might worsen relations with 
China. He also noted American and British hostility to France, and added that 
Indian leadership would welcome a more assertive French diplomatic role in Asia 
(Peyrefitte, 1997; p. 496). 
Indonesian President Sukarno, who hosted the 1955 Bandung Conference of 
nonaligned nations, visited Kennedy in Washington in 1961; in a warm 
atmosphere, Kennedy indicated eagerness to improve relations and his government 
increased foreign assistance (Douglas, 2010; pp. 259-260). But after Johnson 
succeeded Kennedy, two US policy decisions worsened US-Indonesian relations.  
First, Johnson (under pressure from Congressional hardliners) refused in January 
1964 to sign a determination that economic aid to Indonesia was in the US national 
interest; Kennedy would have made such a determination almost routinely.  
Economic aid was then cancelled, although assistance to the Indonesian Army 
continued.  Second, in June 1964 Johnson announced that the US would side with 
Malaysia in an on-going struggle between that country and Indonesia – all without 
consulting his own embassy in Jakarta (Jones, 1971; pp. 299, 342-343).17  In part as 
a consequence of the change in US policies, Sukarno turned for domestic support 
to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and for external support to communist 
China (Jones, 1971; p. 405).  Both of these moves brought counter activity, by a 
faction of the Army against the PKI, and by US-led covert action to replace 
Sukarno (Douglas, 2008; pp. 375-377). In his subsequent account, Howard P. 
Jones, US Ambassador to Indonesia during 1958-1965, discusses Sukarno’s rule, 
the Army’s resistance, and the purge of the communists - while not identifying any 
US role in Vietnam as a factor influencing these events (Jones, 1971; passim). 
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Indeed, for Jones an important consequence of the Vietnam intervention ran in the 
opposite direction - it brought communists in Hanoi and Beijing closer together 
(Jones, 1971: p. 338). Opposition to neutralism in Indonesia and elsewhere 
reflected an often implicit, but essential, argument among those advocating 
continued US presence in Vietnam.  
Nixon, in 1967, as a then unannounced candidate for president, split the 
difference on the role of the US intervention in Vietnam as a stabilizing force.  He 
sided to some extent with the war hawks, as he wrote in Foreign Affairs that the 
“[US] commitment in Vietnam” was “a vital factor in the turnaround in Indonesia.”  
But his endorsement was restrained: he went on to emphasize growing economic 
success in a very large swath of Asian countries and, without saying it explicitly, 
but as Ferguson interprets it, concluded that “ultimate American failure in Vietnam 
really did not matter that much” – capitalism was winning in Asia (pp. 802-803). 
Ferguson promises to consider in his second volume whether Kissinger’s 
concern over credibility was merited. (p. 842n) Here is an interim judgment. As 
Mercer (1996) and Press (2005) argue, major powers faced with security decisions 
will examine where an opponent’s national interests lie, and what its potential 
power resources will be. When the US drew back from war over Berlin or Cuba, it 
did not seriously weaken its power position, but, as Kissinger would argue, it did 
create uncertainty about the structure of defense in Europe and elsewhere (p. 510). 
That was not on balance a change for the worse, as defense structures have since 
moved in a direction they were going to have to move in any event. An obvious 
consequence was that regional powers challenged US leadership on security issues 
after the Cuban crisis, somewhat attenuating the bipolarist framework. For 
example, DeGaulle and Adenauer negotiated a treaty of mutual friendship in 
January 1963. Kissinger remarks in Diplomacy that; 
Vietnam [as it appeared to Nixon and Kissinger in 1969] finally signaled that 
it was high time to reassess America’s role in the developing world, and to 
find some sustainable ground between abdication and overextension 
(Kissinger, 1994: p. 704). (italics added) 
This choice of phrase must mean that Kissinger came subsequently to believe the 
US commitment in Vietnam reflected strategic misjudgment - not simply that an 
advantageous intervention was operationally or tactically mis-managed.  Perhaps, 
as in the case of Berlin and Cuba, US diplomacy should have dealt with challenges 
to US leadership that would result from disengagement in Vietnam - rather than 
doubling down on the earlier mistake. 
It is hard to accept undiluted Morgenthau’s premise that there was no spillover 
from one country to the next, or that there was no momentum in the attraction of 
communism during the 1950s and 1960s, even if communist movements were not 
centrally directed. We cannot conclude that changing strategic direction has no 
costs; the question is whether a new direction is likely to be wise on balance on its 
own merits. The parallel between concessions during potential nuclear crises and 
concessions regarding the Vietnam commitment is closer than we might expect.  It 
was abundantly clear long before Nixon and Kissinger acceded to power in 1969 
that the US was not again going to intervene with hundreds of thousands of troops 
in another divided-country war. 18  That was going to be true no matter what 
measures the Nixon administration would undertake to prevail in Vietnam. The US 
would nevertheless find a way to continue its diplomatic and military leadership – 
without the implicit promise of large or extended American troop deployments 
(Duiker, 1994; pp. 379-383). 
Ferguson’s biography is often depicted as sympathetic to Kissinger. Maybe so, 
but on the not-so-narrow topic of stewardship of Vietnam diplomacy, the detail 
Ferguson provides suggests that, as of January 1969, Kissinger misunderstood what 
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terms of a settlement would have to look like, and exaggerated the reputational 
consequences of altering the US commitment. If anything, these failures followed 
from too much embrace of abstractions – the obligation to defend freedom, the 
obligations to honor commitments, a constrained mental framework of geopolitical 
competition. These mistakes were not based on “realism;” abstractions are a 
species of ideals. Writing forty years after the fact, Kissinger left the door slightly 
open to the possibility that he had assigned too much priority to maintaining the US 
commitment in Vietnam: 
…whether another definition could have been given to American credibility 
[in the context of US Vietnam policy] will remain the subject of heated 
debate (Kissinger, 2014b; p. 301).19 
Ferguson more than once concludes that Morgenthau’s consistently realist 
understanding of options involving Vietnam was superior to Kissinger’s (pp. 823, 
839, 873). Ferguson suggests that his sequel will show a seasoned Kissinger in a 
more realist light, in part a result of having learned from the Vietnam ordeal. But 
regarding Vietnam diplomacy-- it is hard to imagine a Castlereagh or a Bismarck 
as so slow to recognize power dynamics that had been clear to others for years, and 
dragging his country through such a morass for so long.  Nor is it likely that either 
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1 Parenthetical page numbers in text reference Ferguson (2015). 
2 Ferguson notes that (Dickson, 1978) also reviewed Kissinger’s philosophical interests. 
3 On Kantian ethics generally, see (Wolff, 1973).    
4 In an odd mistake, Ferguson describes Morgenthau as “nearly ten years older” than Kissinger. (p. 
17) In fact, their birthdates were nineteen years apart --1904 and 1923 -- and some of Morgenthau’s 
most important work, including Politics Among Nations (1948), appeared before or while Kissinger 
was an undergraduate.   
5 Also, (FRUS, 1996) on Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence; and (Dallek, 2003) on Cuba. 
6 James K.  Galbraith, author of Galbraith (2003), is John Kenneth Galbraith’s son. 
7 Also, (Parker, 2005; pp. 364-377) regarding John Kenneth Galbraith. 
8 Logevall (1992) cites the Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, pp. 193-194. 
9 Logevall (1992) cites NY Times, January 30 and 31, 1964. 
10 Kissinger’s (2003) account was originally included in (Kissinger, 1994) – which predates some of 
the studies cited here.  To my knowledge, Kissinger offers no revision in more recent writings, 
including in (Kissinger, 2014b).  
11 EXCOMM members are listed in [Retrieved from].  
12 Kissinger’s and Nixon’s 1972 memoranda are quoted in (Woodward, 2015; Ch. 20). 
13 For a counter-argument, see (Isaacs, 2015).  
14 Kissinger temporizes somewhat on whether his view in 1969 remains his view forty-some years 
later; see final section, below. 
15 Lacouture (1986; p. 252) described DeGaulle as an “implacable interprete de l’histoire” – a good 
one sentence description of a realist mindset.  
16 The International Control Commission (ICC) was established in 1954 to oversee implementation of 
the Geneva Accords. 
17 Ambassador Howard Palfrey Jones, author of Jones (1971), is not to be confused with Howard 
Jones, author of Jones (2003), cited earlier. 
18 During 1973-1975, the US Congress would not approve war materiel for the RVN.  While US allies 
surely understood that the US would be unlikely to commit troops elsewhere on anything 
approaching the scale it had in Vietnam, the decision not to provide materiel was a different matter 
– and is harder to defend. 
19  What matters from a realist perspective are the consequences of adjusting or abandoning 
commitments.  Treating the question as one of the “’definition’ of credibility” recalls Kissinger’s 
earlier idealist, Kant-inspired language about the process of selecting from among “maxims”. We 
should not over-interpret from the one sentence the topic gets in Kissinger (2014b) – but 
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